Jon: Give me a little bit of chronology. What year were we in?
Raad: I’ve been working on this for quite some bit. When we originally
launched it, we didn’t really raise any capital. I thought it was just going
to be another passive income thing like the apps that I’ve worked on before.
Around 2015, we had a basic MVP up that allowed lawyers to sync their google
calendar and list their real-time availabilities. People can go there, click a slot
and get a free consultation with them.
Around 2016, I applied to 500 start-ups. After getting rejected from them three
times they finally let us in and we built this marketplace-like model transferring
money. We knew we wanted to build out a marketplace that allowed companies
to hire lawyers. We didn’t build out a whole lot of technology at that point. We
were venmoing lawyers for work that they completed because clients would
pay us or hack together some PayPal links.
It wasn’t that sophisticated, but we solved the core problem of connecting people
who need legal work done to people who were available to provide it and then
figured out all the other stuff afterward around pricing and match-making algorithms.
When we’d gotten to 500 start-ups, we were predominantly focused on serving S&Bs
at the time— small businesses, start-ups. We pitched, raised our seed rounds shortly
afterward, and got to a place where we thought we had a good business.
We realized shortly that we didn’t because our retention sucked. If you are an early-stage
startup one of the last things you want to spend lots of money on is a bunch of lawyers.
You’re trying to hire engineers, you're trying to find product-market fit, so it’s last on the
priority list. It didn’t make a lot of sense for us to continue growing the top-line revenue
for this market segment that essentially had a leaky bucket issue.
Jon: It wasn’t a big hair on fire for the customer that they were climbing over
themselves to be a customer.
Raad: We got a lot of them. We did a lot of SEO work, we did ad words but we
failed to raise a Series A because another big competitor came out. We had to
take a hard look at our business model and we came to the conclusion that we
can’t continue on this path and keep growing top-line revenue. We had to get
profitable and that led us to another path of going through our customer segment.
Finding the ones that actually use this every day and were profitable ultimately led
to this gigantic pivot to a different market segment, still within the legal space but
more focused around actual legal departments that had a daily need for legal
services than just quarterly or yearly.
It felt like the worst thing at the time but it was the best thing we did. We had to
say no to three hundred plus customers, start from scratch with five core customers
and rebuild the product.